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public goods imply that school districts should spend up to the point where marginal increases would have
zero effect on local housing prices. Our research design isolates exogenous variation in investments by
comparing school districts where referenda on bond issues targeted to fund capital expenditures passed and
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composition. Our results indicate that California school districts underinvest in school facilities: passing a
referendum causes immediate, sizable increases in home prices, implying a willingness to pay on the part of
marginal homebuyers of $1.50 or more for each $1 of capital spending. These effects do not appear to be
driven by changes in the income or racial composition of homeowners, and the impact on test scores appears
to explain only a small portion of the total housing price effect.
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Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the impact of investments in school facilities using the housing market.  We 
draw on the unique characteristics of California’s system of school finance, comparing districts 
in which school bond referenda passed or failed by narrow margins.  We extend the traditional 
regression discontinuity (RD) design to account for the dynamic nature of bond referenda: the 
probability of future proposals depends on the outcomes of past elections.  Using our “dynamic 
RD” estimator, we first show that bond funds stick exclusively in the capital account, with no 
effect on current expenditures or other revenues.  We can thus interpret the effect of referendum 
passage as reflecting the impact of improvements in the quality of school facilities.  We find that 
passing a referendum causes immediate, sizable increases in home prices, implying a 
willingness-to-pay on the part of marginal homebuyers of $1.50 or more for each dollar per pupil 
of facility spending.  These effects do not appear to be driven by changes in the income or racial 
composition of homeowners.  While we find suggestive evidence that bond passage leads to 
increases in student test scores, this effect cannot explain more than a small portion of the 
housing price effect, indicating that bond passage leads to improvements in other dimensions of 
school output (e.g., safety) that may be not captured by test scores. 
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I.  Introduction 
Federal, state, and local governments spend more than $50 billion per year to build and 
renovate public schools (U.S. Department of Education 2007).  Despite this, many of the more 
than 97,000 public elementary and secondary schools in the United States are in need of 
renovation, expansion, and repair: fully one-third of public schools rely on portable or temporary 
classrooms and one-quarter report that environmental factors, such as air conditioning and 
lighting, are “moderate” or “major” obstacles to instruction (U.S. Department of Education 2007, 
Table 98).  Notwithstanding, little is known about the importance of facility quality to 
educational production.   
Two central difficulties plague the literature on the effects of school resources,1 both 
applicable to the effects of capital spending as well.  First, resources may be endogeneous to 
schooling outcomes.  The few studies2 that have focused explicitly on the effects of capital 
expenditures on student achievement are unable to convincingly separate the causal effects of 
school facilities from other confounding factors, such as the socioeconomic status of local 
families.  Second, many of the effects of resources may be reflected only imperfectly in student 
achievement, so even a credible causal estimate of the effect on test scores might miss many of 
the benefits.  This seems likely to be a particular problem for school facilities, for which the 
benefits may be concentrated in nonacademic outcomes like student health and safety. 
This latter challenge is often avoided by focusing on the impacts of school spending on 
housing markets.  If homebuyers value school spending at the margin more than they value the 
taxes they will pay to finance it, spending increases should lead to increases in housing prices.3  
Indeed, in standard Tiebout (1956)-style models, a positive effect of tax increases on spending is 
direct evidence that the prior spending level was inefficiently low.  As in studies of the effects of 
resources on achievement, however, causal identification is quite challenging. 
                                                 
1 Hanushek (1996) reviews more than 90 studies and 400 estimates of the impact of school resources on 
achievement and concludes that “[s]imple resource policies hold little hope for improving student outcomes”. Card 
and Krueger (1996) dispute Hanushek’s interpretation of the literature.  See also Hanushek (1986, 1997); Card and 
Krueger (1992); and Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996). 
2 See, e.g., Jones and Zimmer (2001); Schneider (2002); and Uline and Tschannen-Moran (2008). 
3 See Oates (1969); Dee (2000); Palmon and Smith (1998); Starrett (1981); Barrow and Rouse (2004); and 
Bradbury, Mayer and Case (2001).  A related body of research uses housing markets to measure household 
willingness to pay for school quality.  See Rosen (1974) for an economic interpretation of the hedonic model, and 
Black (1999); Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007); Kane, Riegg, and Staiger (2006); and Rothstein (2006) for 
empirical applications. 
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This paper reports estimates of the causal effects of school facility spending on both 
home values and student achievement.  We implement a new research design that takes 
advantage of the unique characteristics of California’s school finance system to isolate 
exogenous variation in spending.  While most school finance in California is extremely 
centralized and offers little local discretion, California school districts can issue general 
obligation bonds to finance the construction, improvement, and maintenance of school facilities.4  
Proposed bond measures must be approved in local referenda, and districts that approve bond 
issues are likely to differ on both observable and unobservable dimensions from those that do 
not.  Districts in which bonds pass or fail by very narrow margins, however, are likely to be quite 
similar on average.  Taking advantage of the underlying continuity in district characteristics 
around the threshold for bond approval, we use a regression discontinuity (RD) framework to 
identify the causal impact of bond funding.5  To implement this design, we assemble a rich data 
set combining referenda outcomes with annual district-level measures of house prices, school 
district expenditures, and student test scores spanning two decades. 
Several previous papers have used elections as sources of identification in RD models.6  
Our analysis is complicated by the dynamic nature of the bond proposal process: a district that 
passes a bond measure this year is unlikely to consider or pass another measure next year.  
Conversely, districts that narrowly reject initial proposals are likely to consider new proposals in 
the next election cycle, and these are quite likely to pass.  Specifications that do not take account 
of these dynamics yield attenuated estimates of the effect of bond spending.  We extend the RD 
strategy to panel data with endogenous repeated elections.  Our innovative “dynamic RD” model 
leverages the power of the RD design to provide well-identified estimates of the full dynamic 
structure of the effects of bond funds on fiscal, academic and housing market outcomes.  
Although the bond-funded revenue we study is earmarked for local capital improvements, 
theory predicts that districts will find ways to divert resources toward non-capital purposes.7  We 
find no evidence of this - bond revenues appear to stick entirely in the local capital account and 
we reject even small effects on either current spending or other revenue sources.  This strong 
                                                 
4 Voter approved bonds are also common in other states, including Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Florida.   
5 Early discussions of the RD design include Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and Cook and Campbell (1979).  
For recent overviews, see Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2007). 
6 See, e.g., Lee (2001, 2008), Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), DiNardo and Lee (2004), Cellini (2007), Pettersson-
Lidbom (2008), and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009). 
7 See, e.g., Bradford and Oates (1971a, 1971b) and Knight (2002). 
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flypaper effect allows us to interpret of our estimates of the impact of bond passage as the effects 
of school facility investments. 
We find that passage of a bond leads housing prices in the district to rise by 
approximately three percentage points immediately, rising to about twice that within three years.  
This effect appears to last for at least a decade.  Our estimates imply that marginal homebuyers 
are willing to pay substantially more than $1, via higher purchase prices and expected future 
property taxes, for future school spending with present discounted value of $1.  Even under the 
most conservative assumptions, the willingness-to-pay is never smaller than $1.30, and our 
preferred estimates are $1.50 or more.  The implied elasticity of home prices with respect to 
school spending is approximately 0.5.  This is slightly higher than, but consistent with, 
elasticities obtained by previous studies of unrestricted spending.   
We find little evidence of changes in the income or racial composition of local 
homebuyers following the passage of a bond.  However, we find suggestive evidence that bond 
passage leads to higher student achievement, albeit with a long lag: both math and reading test 
scores increase by 0.07 of a student-level standard deviation by the sixth year after a bond 
passage.  While substantial, this result is not entirely robust – although the 6th year effect is 
individually significant, we cannot reject that all lagged effects are zero.  Moreover, even effects 
as large as our 6th year estimate can explain only a small portion of the price effect of bond 
passage.  Evidently, much of the value of school facilities to homeowners derives from 
dimensions of school output that are not reflected in student test scores.  This highlights the 
importance of using housing markets—rather than simply test score gains—to evaluate school 
investments.   
Our results provide clear evidence that school districts under-invest in school facilities, as 
homebuyers value a dollar of school facility spending at much more than $1.  While much of the 
public choice literature emphasizes the potential for over-spending by “Leviathan” governments, 
our results suggest that the opposite is the case.  Caution is required, however, in attempting to 
generalize these results beyond our sample: California has unusually low school spending, 
particularly in the capital account, and marginal returns may be lower in other states.  Even 
within California effects may differ for districts that are not at the margin of approving a bond 
issue.  Nevertheless, finding that investments in school facilities have a positive impact on 
housing prices and (perhaps) student achievement is an important result.  It also suggests that 
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California-style restrictions on local public good provision have important efficiency costs, and 
that school spending levels may be too low. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the California 
school finance system.  Section III develops simple economic models of resource allocation and 
capitalization.  Section IV details our research design.  Section V describes the data, Section VI 
validates our regression discontinuity strategy, and Section VII presents our estimates.  Section 
VIII concludes. 
 
II.  California School Finance 
California was historically known for its high-quality, high-spending school system.  By 
the 1980s and 1990s, however, California schools were widely considered underfunded.  By 
1995, per-pupil current spending had fallen to 13 percent below the national average, ranking the 
state 35th in the country despite its relatively high costs.  Capital spending has been particularly 
stingy, 30 percent below the national average in 1995.8  California schools are notorious for their 
overcrowding, poor physical conditions, and heavy reliance on temporary, modular classrooms 
(see, e.g., New York Times 1989, Sebastian 2006). 
Much of the decline in school funding has been attributed to the state’s shift to a 
centralized system of finance under the 1971 Serrano v. Priest decision and to the passage in 
1978 of Proposition 13, which eliminated school districts’ flexibility to set tax and spending 
levels and, moreover, starved the state of revenue with which to assist districts.9  In 1984, 
however, voters approved Proposition 46.  The Proposition allowed school districts to issue 
general obligation bonds to finance capital projects and to raise the local property tax rate for the 
duration of the bonds in order to pay them off.10  Bonds must be approved by referendum.  
Initially, a 2/3 vote was required, but beginning in 2001 proposals that adhered to certain 
restrictions could qualify for a reduced threshold of 55%.  Brunner and Reuben (2001) attribute 
                                                 
8 Statistics in this paragraph are computed from U.S. Department of Education (2007), Table 174, and U.S. 
Department of Education (1998), Tables 165 and 42. 
9 See Fischel (1989), Shapiro and Sonstelie (1982) and Sonstelie, Brunner, and Ardun (2000) for further details and 
discussion of California’s school finance reforms. 
10 Local electorates can also approve parcel taxes for school funding, though these are comparatively rare.  Parcel 
tax revenues have much fewer restrictions than school bonds (Orrick 2004, p.1).  Although we focus on general 
obligation bonds in the analysis below, we present some specifications that incorporate parcel taxes as well. 
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32% of California school facility spending between 1992-93 and 1998-99 to local bond 
referenda.  The leading alternative source of funds was state aid.11 
The ballot summary for a representative proposal reads: 
Shall Alhambra Unified School District repair, upgrade and equip all local 
schools, improve student safety conditions, upgrade electrical wiring for 
technology, install fire safety, energy efficient heating/cooling systems, emergency 
lighting, fire doors, replace outdated plumbing/sewer systems, repair leaky 
rundown roofs/bathrooms, decaying walls, drainage systems, repair, construct, 
acquire, equip classrooms, libraries, science labs, sites and facilities, by issuing 
$85,000,000 of bonds at legal rates, requiring annual audits, citizen oversight, 
and no money for administrators' salaries? (Institute for Social Research 2006) 
Bond revenues must go to pre-specified capital projects (CA Legislative Information Website 
2006).  Anecdotally, bonds are frequently used to build new permanent classrooms that replace 
temporary buildings (Sebastian 2006a, 2006b) and to provide facilities needed to expand from 
half-day to full-day kindergarten (DiMassa 2003).  But repair and maintenance are also 
permissible uses, raising the possibility that districts that were previously funding maintenance 
out of unrestricted funds might divert those funds to other purposes when bonds are approved. 
629 of the 1,035 school districts in California voted on at least one bond measure 
between 1987 and 2006.12  The average number of measures per school district considered over 
this period was slightly over two.13  Many of the elections were close: 35% of all bond measures 
had margins of victory or defeat of less than 5 percentage points.  Table 1 shows the number of 
measures proposed and passed in each year, along with the average bond amount (in 2000$ per 
pupil), the distribution of required vote shares for bond approval, and the mean and standard 
deviation of observed vote shares. 
Balsdon, Brunner, and Rueben (2003) study the decision to propose and pass a bond 
measure.  We add one point to their discussion: California’s unique property tax rules affect 
voters’ incentives regarding bond measures.  Under Proposition 13, assessed values are frozen at 
the most recent sale price.  This means that older families face disincentives to move after 
children leave the home (Ferreira 2007), which may reduce willingness to support the public 
                                                 
11 The state aid programs target districts based on building age and capacity.  If local revenues are used to expand 
capacity or replace old school buildings, bond passage may reduce the district’s eligibility for state aid.  We 
investigate this empirically below. 
12 These data come from the California Education Data Partnership.  More details are provided in Section V. 
13 264 districts had only one measure on the ballot between 1987 and 2006, while 189 districts had 2 measures, 99 
districts had 3 measures, 53 districts had 4 measures, and 30 districts had 5 or more measures.  The maximum was 
10 measures.   
 
6 
schools.  There is also substantial variation within districts in the tax price of local spending, as 
new buyers pay a share of any tax increases that is far out of proportion to their share of the 
district’s total property values.  We discuss implications of these incentives below. 
 
III.  Theoretical Framework 
A.  School Resources and Flypaper Effects 
Studies of school resources often invoke an “educational production function” that links 
school resources—facilities, teacher quality, and class size, for example—to measurable student 
outcomes.  If school districts allocate resources optimally to their most productive uses, 
exogenous increases in unrestricted school funding should improve student outcomes.  Evidence 
that resources do not affect outcomes has often been taken as an indication that schools are 
inefficiently managed (e.g., Hanushek 1986, 1997). 
In theory, it should not matter whether marginal resources are restricted to certain 
purposes, such as capital expenditures: districts will simply divert unrestricted funds away from 
those targeted categories, with no effect on the total allocation.  The only exception would arise 
if the districts are at a corner solution, devoting none of their unrestricted funds to the targeted 
categories.  We develop a simple model illustrating this in Appendix A. 
Despite this well-known, widely accepted theory, a large body of evidence documents an 
empirical anomaly: restricted grants tend to stick, even when the pre-grant allocation to the 
targeted account is non-zero.  This so-called “flypaper” effect is well documented in a variety of 
settings, most notably in the context of intergovernmental grants (e.g. Bradford and Oates 1971a, 
1971b).14  Knight (2002), however, has challenged the evidence for flypaper effects, arguing that 
most papers do not adequately account for the endogeneity of intergovernmental grants. 
Our regression discontinuity design represents a solution to this endogeneity problem, 
and permits us to identify the causal effect of restricted funding on both resource allocations and 
other revenues (e.g. state aid).  In the empirical application we further distinguish between 
districts where prior spending patterns indicate that the restriction should or should not be 
                                                 
14 Gordon (2004) finds that flypaper effects of intergovernmental grants are short-lived, but Barrow and Rouse 
(2004) find persistent effects.  Flypaper effects have also been documented in corporate finance (Kaplan and 
Zingales 1997) and, more recently, in intra-household consumption (Duflo and Udry 2004), and individual 
investment decisions (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2007).  See Hines and Thaler (1995) for a survey.   
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binding.  We find strong evidence of flypaper effects for both sets of districts, and are able to 
reject even small spillovers and crowd-out effects.  
These results imply that our analysis of earmarked bonds will identify the impact of a 
specific type of school resource—school facilities.  It is an open question whether capital 
improvements will lead to improved student achievement.  Education researchers and reformers 
often cite overcrowded classrooms; poor ventilation, indoor air quality, temperature control, or 
lighting; inadequate computer hardware or wiring; and broken windows or plumbing, as 
problems that can interfere with student learning.  Mitigating these types of environmental 
conditions may bring substantial gains to student achievement in the short-run by reducing 
distractions and missed school days (see Earthman 2002, Mendell and Heath 2004, and 
Schneider 2002 for reviews of this literature).  Improved conditions may also benefit teachers—
reducing absenteeism, improving morale, and potentially reducing turnover (Buckley, Schneider, 
and Shang, 2005)—all of which may in turn impact student achievement (e.g. Clotfelter, Vigdor, 
and Ladd 2007).  But direct evidence regarding the effects of investments in school facilities is in 
extremely short supply. 
Importantly, the services provided by capital investments may be reflected only 
imperfectly in student test scores.  Infrastructure improvements may produce improvements in 
student safety, athletic and art training, or the aesthetic appeal of the campus, all of which may 
be valued by parents or homeowners, without any effect on academic achievement.   
B.  Voting, Housing Prices and the Value of School Facilities 
One way to sidestep the challenges inherent in the measurement of school outputs is to 
focus on the revealed preferences of parents and homeowners, as seen in housing markets.  Local 
net-of-tax housing prices should reflect the utility that home-buyers derive from the full menu of 
local public goods.  In this study, we examine compensated funding shifts, additional revenues 
that are accompanied by an increased tax burden.  Thus, if funds are misspent or simply yield 
smaller benefits than would the consumption that must be foregone due to increased taxes, pre-
tax housing prices should fall when bond proposals pass.  By contrast, if the effect on school 
output is valued more than the foregone non-school consumption, home prices will rise when 
bonds are passed.  It can be shown that the efficient choice of spending levels will equate the 
marginal utility of consumption with that of school spending, so positive price effects imply that 
the prior spending level was inefficiently low. 
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The development of a full equilibrium model of house prices, household location 
decisions and provision of local public goods is beyond the scope of this paper.15  We merely 
provide a bit of intuition regarding the factors that determine home price effects due to 
exogenous school investments.  Among other simplifications, we neglect heterogeneity in 
residents’ tax shares and within-community variation in the amount of housing consumed.  We 
assume that the utility of family i living in district j depends on local school output Aj, exogenous 
amenities Xj, and other consumption ci: uij = Ui(Aj, Xj, ci).  The consumer has income wi and faces 
the budget constraint ci ≤ wi – rj – pj, where rj represents the property taxes needed to fund school 
operations and pj is the (rental) price of local housing.  Service quality depends on tax revenues, 
Aj = A(rj); if districts use funds inefficiently, A’(r) will be low. 
We first discuss the household location decision, taking spending as given, and then 
discuss the preferences of voters.  A family chooses the community that provides the highest 
utility, taking into account housing prices, taxes, and service quality.  Writing the family’s 
indirect utility in district j as U(A(rj), Xj, wi – rj – pj), the implicit function theorem yields the 
family’s bid for housing in district j as a function of amenities and taxes, gij = gi(Xj, rj).
16  This 
bid-rent function depends on the prices, amenities, and tax rates of all other communities in the 
family’s choice set; taking these as given, community j will provide higher utility than any 
alternative community so long as pj < gij.   
The family’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a marginal increase in rj in its chosen district 
is ∂gi(Xj, rj)/∂rj. It can be shown that  
(1) ∂gi(Xj, rj)/∂rj = (∂U/∂c)
-1[A’(rj) * (∂U/∂A)] - 1. 
This value will be positive if and only if the marginal product of school revenues multiplied by 
the marginal utility of school outputs (in brackets) is greater than the marginal utility of 
consumption.  Ignoring momentarily the effect of spending on local housing prices, the family’s 
optimal tax and service level satisfies ∂gi(Xj, rj)/∂rj = 0.  If ∂gi(Xj, rj)/∂rj > 0, the district’s 
spending is below the family’s preferred level; if ∂gi(Xj, rj)/∂rj < 0, the family would prefer that 
taxes and services be cut. 
                                                 
15 The basic model is due to Brueckner (1979, 1982, 1983).  Barrow and Rouse (2004) provide an accessible 
discussion. For more complex models that incorporate Tiebout sorting and voting, see Epple, Filimon and Romer 
(1984, 1993), Benabou (1993) and Nechyba (1997). 
16 Gi(rj) is defined implicitly by U(A(rj), Xj, wi – rj – gi(Xj, rj)) = maxkj U(A(rk), Xk, wi – rk – pk). 
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In equilibrium, the price of housing in district j equals the bid of the marginal consumer, 
who must be indifferent between this district and another alternative.  Thus, local housing prices, 
p*(Xj, rj), will respond positively to increases in r if and only if the prior level of school spending 
was below the preferred level of the marginal resident.  
When a tax increase does take place, low-WTP residents will tend to leave the 
community and be replaced by in-movers with higher WTP.  Tiebout-style models typically 
assume that higher-income families have higher willingness-to-pay for school quality.  Thus, tax 
increases may lead to increases in the mean income of district residents.  Because A depends 
directly on community composition, dA/dr will reflect both the direct effect of spending on 
achievement and an indirect effect operating through effects of r on the characteristics of the 
district’s students.  House prices will reflect both, plus an additional component if families 
directly value high income neighbors (Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan, 2004).  In the empirical 
analyses below we test for residential sorting by investigating the effects of bond passage on 
both the income and race of new homebuyers and on school district demographics. 
Tax changes are not exogenous, but depend on election outcomes.  For example, absentee 
landlords should vote for any proposal that would lead to an increase in housing rents.  Thus, to 
the extent that spending levels are set by such landlords, taxes will be set at the property-value-
maximizing level.  The first-order effect of an exogenous change in tax rates will be zero, and 
the second-order effect negative.  But absentee landlords do not vote; residents do.  There are 
several circumstances in which residents will oppose spending increases even though ∂p*(Xj, 
rj)/∂rj > 0.  Most obviously, any renter who values spending less than the marginal resident – for 
whom ∂gi(Xj, rj)/∂rj < ∂p
*(Xj, rj)/∂rj – will vote against a proposed spending increase, as the 
utility she will derive from higher spending will not compensate her for the increased rent that 
she will pay.  Similarly, a homeowner who does not wish to move will vote on the basis of her 
own bid-rent, not the community’s price function, and will oppose a tax increase if ∂gi(Xj, rj)/∂rj 
< 0.  Thus, in general we should not expect that equilibrium spending levels will satisfy ∂p*(Xj, 
rj)/∂rj = 0. 
There are several aspects of California’s tax and school finance system that will tend to 
lead to under-provision relative to the preferences of marginal residents.  First, property 
valuations are frozen at the initial sale price.  Where in other states “empty nesters” whose kids 
have grown will tend to move to a smaller house in a low-service community, in California they 
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face strong incentives to remain in their original homes.  Immobile empty nesters will almost 
certainly oppose spending increases, as they derive little direct utility from school spending and 
see only paper gains from increases in local housing prices.  Second, California’s school finance 
is extremely centralized, and local residents have little control over spending.  Hoxby (2001) 
argues that California-type systems will tend to lead to under-provision, at least in wealthy 
communities.  If so, houses in high-spending districts are under-supplied, and exogenous 
increases in r will lead to higher prices. 
A final issue concerns timing.  Capital projects take time to plan, initiate, and carry out, 
so bonds issued today will take several years to translate into improved capital services.  Thus, 
direct measures of school outputs will reflect the effects of bond passage only with long lags.  
But current house prices reflect the present discounted value of all future services less all future 
taxes, so should rise or fall as soon as the outcome of the election is known.17  This may happen 
well before the election if the outcome is easy to predict, but when the election is close there is 
likely important information revealed on election day. 
 
IV.  Empirical Research Design 
A.  Regression Discontinuity 
In general, school districts with higher test scores and graduation rates also have higher 
property values, lower tax prices of school spending, and residents with greater willingness to 
pay for school quality.  The resulting correlation between school quality and locally funded 
spending cannot be interpreted causally. 
California’s bond referenda provide a source of variation that can be used to overcome 
the endogeneity of school spending.  The use of vote shares in a regression discontinuity design 
was first developed by Lee (2001, 2008).  Lee demonstrates that comparing bare losers with bare 
winners provides quasi-random variation in winner status, since for narrowly decided races the 
outcome is unlikely to be correlated with other district characteristics as long as there is some 
unpredictable component of the ultimate vote.  That is, if j is the vote share and * is the 
                                                 
17 By design, bonds decouple the timing of tax revenue from spending.  This can create complex post-election price 
dynamics.  We discuss these in an Appendix.  The basic point that the net value of the bond-financed spending 
relative to the taxes needed to pay for it is capitalized on or before the date of the election is unchanged. 
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threshold required for passage, unobserved district characteristics μj may vary with j but should 
be similar for districts with j = * + ε and j = * - ε (for small ε). 
Formally, the required assumption is that E[μj | j] is continuous at j = *.  If we assume  
(2) yj =  + bj + μj,  
where bj is an indicator for bond passage (i.e. for j ≥ *) and yj is some outcome, we can write 
(3) E[yj | j] =  + E[bj | j] + E[μj | j] =  + bj + E[μj | j].  
Then the assumed continuity of E[μj | j] at * implies that: 
(4) 
* *
lim [ | ] lim [ | ]
j j
j j j jv v v v
E y v E y v 
 
  . 
There are several available strategies for consistently estimating the discontinuity in E[yj | 
j] at *.  First, one can focus narrowly on the region around * to estimate E[yj | * - ε < j < *] 
and E[yj | * ≤ j < * + ε], discarding observations with vote shares far from *.  This 
consistently estimates β so long as ε shrinks toward zero as the sample size grows.  A second 
strategy uses all of the data, but approximates E[μj | j] with a polynomial expansion: 
(5) E[yj | j] =  + bj + 0 + j1 + … + jkk.  
If the polynomial in j is sufficiently flexible, it should absorb any correlation between 
unobservables and the bond passage indicator.  This polynomial strategy is consistent if the order 
of the polynomial, k, rises with the sample size.18  The benefit of the polynomial expansion 
approach is that it allows use of all of the data, even while asymptotically identifying β only from 
observations with j  close to *.  This becomes useful when we consider the dynamics of bond 
proposal and passage, as a district that has multiple elections may see a close vote in one but not 
in the others. 
B.  Panel Data and the Dynamic RD 
We have annual observations on our outcome measures, and bonds may affect outcomes 
with long lags.  Let  be the effect of passing a measure in year t- on outcomes measured in 
year t, with  = 0 for   [0, ] .  Let bj,s be an indicator for whether district j passed a measure 
in year s.  Then the data generating process for the outcome in year t can be written as: 
                                                 
18 The polynomial approximation strategy requires only one assumption beyond those required for the narrow 
window strategy:  That E[μj | j] is continuous everywhere, rather than just in a region around ν*. 
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(6) ,
0
jt j t jty b

 

  

   . 
μjt may have district-specific, time-specific, and idiosyncratic components: μjt = uj + t + vjt.  
Any or all of these may be correlated with the bj,s sequence. 
We take two approaches to adapting the RD model to panel data, distinguished by the 
way that repeated measures in the same district are handled.  First, in what we refer to as our 
“static RD” estimator, we treat each measure separately.  For each measure in district j, we select 
all observations from district j from two years before the election to six years after, irrespective 
of whether there were other measures in the interim.  Defining the year of the election as t0 and 
the relative year as τ ≡ t-t0, we estimate the following regression: 
(7) 
0 0 0, , ,
( )jt j t j t j t t jty b P v u             . 
Here, 
0,j t
b is the outcome of the measure (pass or fail), and 
0,j t
v is the vote share.  ()P is a 
polynomial (e.g., a cubic).  Both the γτ coefficients and those of the Pτ polynomial vary freely 
with .  λ and δt are fixed effects for relative and absolute years, respectively. 
Our preferred specification of the static RD model includes measure fixed effects (
0,j t
 ) 
and constrains the γτ and Pτ coefficients to zero for τ <= 0.
19  The balance of outcomes before the 
election – as one would expect from the RD design – means that the measure fixed effects are 
unnecessary for identification.  We nevertheless include them as they absorb important 
heterogeneity and allow for much more precise estimates.20  Also, as discussed in Section II, * 
varies across measures – some require a 55% vote and others a 67% vote to pass.  We include in 
(7) a control for * (allowing the coefficient to vary with τ).21 
Note that observations may appear more than once in our static RD sample, linked to 
different measures.  For example, if a district had elections in 2000 and 2002, its 2004 outcomes 
would appear both for the first election (with τ = 4) and for the second (with τ = 2).  We cluster 
by school district to account for the dependence that this creates. 
                                                 
19 For house price regressions we allow γ0 and P0(ν) to be non-zero as well, since passage may have immediate 
effects on prices.  We have also tried excluding the measure effects and estimating the γτ and Pτ coefficients even 
τ<0.  This is a specification test: measure passage should not have effects before the election (Rothstein, 2008).  
Indeed, our estimates of γτ are small and insignificant for τ < 0. 
20 On the use of fixed effects in standard RD estimates, see Petterssom-Lidbom (2007). 
21 We also use the variation in * to form a specification check for the assumption that unobserved district 
characteristics are continuous at *: we look for evidence that E[y | ] is discontinuous at  = 0.55 when the 
threshold was 67%, and vice versa. 
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Equation (7) can be seen as a reduced form for (6) in which the  coefficients capture 
both the direct effects of bond passage at lag  ( in (6)) and indirect effects of passage in year t0 
on the likelihood of passing further measures in the intervening years {t0+1, …, t}.  These 
indirect effects can be represented by 
1
, ,
0
(d / d )j t s j t s
s
b b

 

 

 , where dbs/dbt is the effect of measure 
passage in year t on other bond measure passage in year s.  We show in Section VI that 
empirically, dbs/dbt is negative and fairly large: one consequence of passing a measure today is 
to reduce the likelihood of passing a measure in the next few years.  Therefore, so long as the 
lagged effects s all have the same sign, we expect (7) to under-estimate the true lagged effects. 
RD analyses of repeated elections frequently model those after the first as sources of 
noncompliance in the quasi-experiment created by the first election.  This can motivate an 
instrumental variables strategy, in which passage of the first measure is used as an instrument for 
an indicator for whether any measure was ever passed, conditional on flexible controls for the 
first election vote share.22  This IV approach is predicated on the assumption that an “ever passed 
a measure” indicator can summarize the treatment history.  It is therefore poorly suited to the 
task of obtaining estimates of the unrestricted lagged treatment effects in (6). 
To obtain estimates that are interpretable as the true lagged effects in the presence of 
multiple elections, we turn to our second strategy, which we refer to as a “dynamic RD” 
specification.  To our knowledge this is the first regression discontinuity application that 
incorporates dynamic treatment effects.  We use the full panel of observations on districts over 
time, including each observation exactly once.  We form an indicator, mj,s, for whether district j 
had a measure on the ballot in year s, and we set bj,s = j,s = 0 whenever mj,s = 0.  We then regress 
outcomes on a full set of lags of m, b, and a polynomial in , allowing all coefficients to vary 
freely with τ: 
(8)    jttj
τ
τ
τtjτττtjττtjjt uδανPθbλmy  


0
,,, .  
                                                 
22 This can be seen as a “fuzzy” RD design, as described by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001).  Our static 
RD model, which ignores future elections, can be seen as the reduced form for the IV regression.  See Lee, Moretti 
and Butler (2004) for a related application where repeated elections have known lags. 
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We include time effects (δt) to absorb changes in the price level.  The district fixed effects (αj) 
absorb persistent differences across districts that are unrelated to bond passage.23   
Relative to (7), (8) can be seen as controlling for intermediate outcomes: passage of a 
bond in year t0 may influence mj,s and j,s for any s> t0.  Under the standard RD assumption that 
measure passage is as good as randomly assigned conditional on a smooth function of j,s, any 
influence of past elections on bj,s itself should be absorbed through the ,( )j sP v  polynomial.  The 
 coefficients can therefore be interpreted as consistent estimates of the causal effects of bond 
passage at lag , net of any effects operating through successive bond proposals and votes.24 
 
V.  Data 
Bond and parcel tax data are drawn from a database maintained by the California 
Education Data Partnership.  The data include year of the measure, bond amount, its intended 
purpose, vote shares, required vote shares for passage of the measure, and voter turnout.  Our 
sample includes all general obligation bond measures sponsored by school districts between 
1987 and 2006.  We merge these to district-level enrollment, revenue, and spending data from 
the Common Core of Data (CCD).  The data contain annual measures of capital and current 
expenditures, revenues, and long-term debt between 1995 and 2006.  We also extract from the 
CCD the number of schools, enrollment, and student demographics, each measured annually.25   
We obtain annual average home prices (averaged over all transactions) and other 
characteristics of transacted homes (square footage and lot size) at the census block group level 
from a proprietary database.  The data, compiled from public records by the real estate services 
firm Dataquick, describes all housing transactions in California from 1988 to 2005.26  We used 
GIS mapping software to assign census block groups to school districts.27 
                                                 
23 As in the static specification, we have also estimated versions of (8) that omit the district fixed effects and 
estimate the λτ, θτ, and Pτ coefficients even for τ < 0.   
24 Even our dynamic RD can be seen as a reduced form estimate, as we do not control for all of the other intervening 
events – superintendent and mayoral elections, changes in state aid, etc. – that may be influenced by bond passage.  
We also focus on the simple effect of bond passage, rather than the effects of the particular uses to which the bond 
revenues are put (e.g. window repairs, lighting improvements, new construction, etc.).   
25 Some districts merge or split in two during our sample period.  Where possible, we combine observations to form 
a consistent unit over time, adding the spending and enrollment data for the constituent districts.   
26 The majority of housing transactions happen from May through August.  We assign measures to housing data 
treating the year containing the first summer after the measure election as the year of the election.  Thus, an election 
in November 2005 is treated as occurring in the same year as housing transactions from 2006.  To merge measures 
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Our prices reflect only houses that sell during the year.  If the mix of houses that transact 
changes—for example, one might expect sales of houses that can accommodate families with 
children to react differently to school spending than do smaller houses—this will lead our 
measures to be biased relative to the quantity of interest, the prices of all houses in the district.  
We take two steps to minimize this bias.  First, when we average block groups to the district 
level, we weight them by their year-2000 populations rather than by the number of transactions.28  
This ensures the location of transactions within the district is held constant.  Second, we include 
in our models of housing prices several control variables that may help to absorb differential 
selection: the average size (square footage) and lot size of transacted homes as well as the 
number of sales. 
Our test score data merge results from several different tests.  From 2003 to 2007, the 
most consistently available measures of student achievement are third grade reading and math 
scores on the California Achievement Tests (CAT).  The most comparable measures in earlier 
years are based on the Stanford-9 exam, given each year between 1998 and 2002.  Though they 
were developed by different publishers and therefore not directly comparable, both the CAT and 
Stanford-9 exams are nationally-normed multiple-choice exams.  Before 1998, test score data are 
more limited.  We use California Learning Assessment System (CLAS) reading and math test 
scores for fourth graders for 1993 and 1994.  To account for differences in exams across years, 
we standardize the scaled scores each year using school-level means and standard deviations. 
Finally, we constructed the racial composition and average family income of homebuyers 
in each district between 1992 and 2006 from data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA).  We use a GIS matching procedure similar to the one implemented for house 
prices to map the tract-level HMDA data to school districts.  We treat our measure as 
characterizing in-migrants to the district, though we are unable to exclude intra-district movers 
from the calculation.  Note also that renters are not represented in these data. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables described above.  Column 1 shows 
the means and standard deviations computed over all district-year observations in our data.  
                                                                                                                                                             
to academic-year data from the CCD, we treat any measure between May 2005 and April 2006 as occurring during 
the 2005-06 academic year. 
27 When school district boundaries and block group boundaries do not line up we use population weights based on 
the proportion of a block group located within a school district. 
28 Our results are robust to other schemes for weighting blocks within districts.   
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Columns 2 and 3 divide the sample between districts that proposed at least one measure from 
1987 to 2006 and those that did not.  Districts that proposed measures are larger than those that 
did not and have higher test scores, incomes, and housing prices, but smaller lot sizes. 
Columns 4 and 5 focus on districts that approved and rejected school bonds, using data 
from the year just before the bond election, while column 6 presents differences between them.  
Districts that passed measures had 26% higher enrollment, $557 more in debt per pupil, and 
$200 higher current instructional spending, although this is somewhat offset by a smaller $163 in 
construction outlays.  Total per-pupil expenditures are similar.  Districts that passed measures 
also had higher house prices and incomes. 
 
VI.  Testing the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design 
A.  Balance of Treatment and Control Groups 
In light of the large pre-existing differences between districts that pass and fail measures, 
it is important to verify that our regression discontinuity design can eliminate these differences.  
We examine three diagnostics for the validity of the RD quasi-experiment, based on the 
distribution of vote shares, pre-election differences in mean outcomes, and differences in pre-
election trends.  Tests of the balance of outcome variable means and trends before the election 
are possible only because of the panel structure of our data, and provide particularly convincing 
evidence regarding the approximate randomness of measure passage. 
Figure 1 shows the histogram of bond measure vote shares, separately for measures that 
require 2/3 and 55% of the vote.  Discontinuous changes in density around the threshold can be 
an indication of endogenous sorting around this threshold, which would violate the RD 
assumptions (McCrary, 2008).  We see no evidence of such changes at either threshold.   
Columns 1-4 of Table 3 present regressions of fiscal, housing, and academic variables 
measured in the year before a bond is proposed on the election outcome, with various controls.  
The first column includes only year effects and an indicator for a 55% threshold.  It reveals large 
pre-measure differences in several outcomes.  The second column adds a cubic polynomial in the 
measure vote share.  This addition eliminates most of the significant estimates, shrinking the 
point estimates substantially.   
The specifications in Columns 1-2 are estimated from a sample that includes only 
observations from the year before the election.  Columns 3-4 switch to our “static RD” sample, 
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pooling observations from two years before through six years after the election.  We generalize 
equation (7) by freeing up the γ-1 coefficient, the “effect” of bond passage in the year before the 
election, and report only that coefficient in the table.  Column 3 reports the static specification 
without measure fixed effects, while column 4 includes them.  Pooling the data does not 
substantially change the estimates.  The fixed effects specification in Column 4, however, has 
much smaller (in absolute value) point estimates and standard errors, particularly in the housing 
and test score specifications.  The fixed effects evidently absorb much of the variation in 
outcomes that are not related to bond election vote shares. 
Columns 5-7 in Table 3 repeat our three first specifications, taking as the dependent 
variable the change in each outcome between year t-1 and t.  Although the model without 
controls shows some differences in trends between districts that pass and fail measures, these are 
eliminated when we include controls for the vote share.  Overall, there seems to be little cause 
for concern about the approximate randomness of the measure passage indicator in our RD 
framework.  Once we control for a cubic in the measure vote share, measure passage does not 
appear to be correlated with pre-treatment trends of any of the outcomes we examine.29 
B.  School Bond Dynamics 
As noted earlier, school districts where a measure fails are more likely to have proposed 
and passed a subsequent measure than are districts where the initial measure passes.  This pattern 
is particularly pronounced when the initial vote is close.  Figure 2 shows the number of 
additional measures considered (left panel) and approved (right panel) over the four years 
following an election.  We show averages outcomes for two-percentage-point bins defined by the 
vote share relative to the threshold.  There is a clear discontinuity at measure passage.  Passing 
an initial measure reduces the number of future elections by nearly 1, on average, and reduces 
the number that pass by about 0.6.  Figure 3 offers another view, plotting estimates from our 
static RD specification of the effect of measure passage on the cumulative number of measures 
passed between t0 and t.  Most of the effect is concentrated in the first four years; by this point, 
the difference in the total number of measures passed between near-passers and near-failures in 
the initial election has fallen to approximately 0.4. 
 
                                                 
29 We also applied similar tests to other covariates, such as sales volume, housing characteristics, and income of 
homebuyers.  We found no evidence of “effects” on any of these. 
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VII.  Results 
A.  School District Spending and Flypaper Effects 
We begin our investigation of the effects of measure passage by examining fiscal 
outcomes.  Figures 4, 5, and 6 present graphical analyses of long term debt, capital outlays and 
current spending by margin of victory or defeat, respectively.  As in Figure 2, we show average 
outcomes in two-percentage-point bins defined by the vote share relative to the threshold.  These 
are computed separately for the year prior to the election and for the third year after the election, 
and we control for calendar year effects.30  For example, the leftmost point shows the average 
outcome for measures that lost by between 8 and 10 percentage points. 
There is no sign of a discontinuity in the debt or capital spending measures in the year 
before the election.  By contrast, three years later, districts where the measure just passed have 
about $3,000 more debt per pupil than districts where the measure narrowly failed, and spend 
about $1,000 more per pupil on capital outlays.  There is no evidence whatsoever of a similar 
discontinuity in current spending, before or after the election. 
Table 4 presents estimates of our static RD specification for several fiscal measures.  As 
one would expect, the passage of a school bond measure results in an immediate, substantial 
increase in a school district’s total debt per pupil (Column 1), amounting to about $1,900 per 
pupil in the first year and $2,300 in the second.  The effect declines quickly thereafter.  Columns 
2, 3, and 4 present estimates for total district expenditures per pupil, capital outlays per pupil, 
and current instructional expenditures per pupil.31  Bond passage has no significant effect on any 
of these in the first year.  In years 2, 3, and 4, passage causes large increases in total expenditures 
and capital expenditures; these then die away by year 5.  There is no indication of any effect on 
current spending in any year, and confidence intervals rule out effects amounting to anything 
larger than $100 per pupil in every year.  This is dramatic evidence for flypaper effects—bond 
revenues appear to “stick” entirely in the capital account.  Column 5 presents estimates of the 
effect of bond passage on state aid.  These demonstrate another form of flypaper effect: there is 
                                                 
30 The bin corresponding to measures that failed by less than 2 percentage points is the category excluded from the 
regression, so estimates may be interpreted as differences relative to that bin.  Results are robust to exclusion of the 
year controls.   
31 Total expenditures equal the sum of capital outlays, current instructional expenditures, current non-instructional 
expenditures, and debt service payments.  We examine non-instructional spending below.  Bond passage has a 
positive mechanical effect on debt service payments.  See Appendix Table 1. 
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no indication that bond revenues crowd out state funding, and indeed all of the point estimates 
are positive. 
Table 5 reports estimates of our dynamic RD specification for all fiscal variables, with 
district fixed effects and pre-election effects constrained to zero.  Column 1 shows that effects on 
debt grow through year 3, when they reach $3,400, and stay roughly constant thereafter.  
Columns 2 and 3 show that the bond revenues are spent primarily in years 2-5 after passage.   
Figure 7 presents estimates from both our static and dynamic specifications for capital 
spending, showing the latter all the way out to the 18th year after the election (the last that we can 
estimate).  The two specifications yield nearly identical effects in the first two years.  As 
discussed above, the dynamic response of bond proposals to earlier bond outcomes implies that 
the static framework will understate the effect of bond passage at longer lags.   Indeed, the 
dynamic specification yields much larger effects in years three through six.  Sizeable positive 
effects persist until year eight, then disappear.  Appendix Figure 1 shows results from an 
alternative specification that excludes the district fixed effects and allows for effects before the 
date of the election.  There is no sign of any effect outside of the zero to eight range.  
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 7 show results for current spending and state aid.  In each year, 
we can reject effects as small as $100 on current spending and there is no evidence of diversions 
of state aid.  The cumulative change in total expenditures in Column 2 is larger than the change 
in district debt in Column 1.  It appears that districts are not using all of their newly-approved 
authority to issue bonds, and instead are spending some of the additional property tax revenues 
that derive from the passage of the bond measure directly on capital projects rather than on debt 
service.  Appendix Table 1 presents estimates for a variety of balance sheet measures; results are 
consistent with this story. 
Table 6 presents a variety of alternative specifications meant to probe the robustness of 
our fiscal results.  We focus on the estimates of the dynamic specification; to conserve space we 
report only the estimated effect of measure passage in relative year 4 after the election.  Column 
1 reports the baseline specification.  Columns 2-4 vary the controls for the election vote share: 
Column 2 includes only a linear control; Column 3 allows for three linear segments, with kinks 
at 55% and 67% vote shares; and Column 4 allows separate cubic vote share-outcome 
relationships each of the [0, 55%], [55%, 67%], and [67%, 100%] ranges.  None of these change 
the results appreciably, and in particular none shows evidence of diversion of resources. 
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Columns 5-7 report estimated discontinuities at locations other than the threshold 
required for passage; in each of these specifications, we also allow a discontinuity at the actual 
threshold.  In column 5, we estimate the discontinuity in our outcomes at the counterfactual 
threshold, 55% when * = 2/3 and 2/3 when * = 55%.  We find no discontinuities at this 
threshold, suggesting that any discontinuities seen in our main specifications reflect true effects 
of bond passage.  Similarly, Columns 6 and 7 show estimates for placebo thresholds 10 
percentage points above or below the true threshold.  Only one of the coefficients in these 
columns is significant. 
Finally, the last two columns of Table 6 examine whether our evidence for a flypaper 
effect arises because districts are at corner solutions with respect to capital spending.  We divide 
our sample by the district’s capital spending per pupil in the year before the election, 
distinguishing between districts with above- and below-median ($562 per pupil) spending.  We 
estimate our static specification separately for each subsample, and report the coefficients for 
relative year 4.  There is little sign of differences between the two subsamples; the funds stick in 
the capital account even in districts that appear to have flexibility to divert funds to the current 
account. 
B.  Housing Prices 
Figure 8 provides a graphical analysis of the impact of bond passage on housing prices 
corresponding to the analyses of fiscal outcomes in Figures 2-4.  Two important patterns emerge.  
First, housing prices are positively correlated to vote shares, indicating that higher priced 
districts are more likely to pass bond measures with larger margins of victory.  Second, on the 
right side of the threshold, in districts where bond measures were approved, housing prices 
appear to shift upward by 6 or 7 percentage points by the third year after the election.   
Table 7 presents static and dynamic specifications for housing prices.  We use two 
measures: the average transaction price during the year and its log.  Recall that our housing price 
specification includes controls for the average characteristics of transacted homes; because we 
also include district or measure fixed effects, the coefficients on these variables are identified 
from within-district, over-time changes in the value of housing transactions, and their inclusion 
should help to ameliorate bias coming from differences in the types of homes transacted. 
Columns 1 and 2 present estimates from our static RD specification.  Housing prices 
increase by approximately $12,000 within one year of a bond passage, corresponding to a 2.1% 
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increase in log prices.  The estimated effects rise slightly thereafter, reaching $19,000 and 5.8% 
three years after the election, and fading somewhat thereafter.  Standard errors are somewhat 
large, however, and not all of the estimates are statistically significant.  Columns 3 and 4 show 
estimates from our dynamic model.  Although standard errors are again high, housing prices 
increase by 3% in the year of election and 3.6% one year later.  Effects again rise for the next 
few years, reaching their peaks in year 5 ($28,167 for price levels) and 6 (6.7% for logs).  Figure 
9 reports the coefficients and confidence intervals from Columns 2 and 4 of Table 7, extending 
the latter series out to year 15.  Estimates become extremely imprecise beyond this point, as only 
the earliest measures are used to identify the effect.  There is little fade out in this longer window 
– even 12 years after measure passage, we see about a 6% effect on housing prices.   
Table 8 reports robustness checks for the housing price estimates, using the same 
strategies as in Table 6; we focus on effects at a 5 year lag, when Table 7 indicates that the house 
price effect is largest.  The significance of the effects is somewhat sensitive to the functional 
form of the vote share control (Columns 2-4), but this reflects increasing standard errors more 
than shrinking point estimates.  Indeed, the coefficient estimates are larger in Column 4 than in 
our main specification.  Columns 5, 6, and 7 present estimates for the three placebo thresholds.  
Here, we see some evidence of a negative discontinuity at the counterfactual threshold (Column 
5), but none at the other two.  Point estimates of placebo thresholds for other relative years (not 
shown in the table) do not show any systematic effects. 
As noted in Section 2, districts can impose parcel taxes that generate unrestricted 
revenues, though these are relatively rare.  Parcel taxes may be substitutes for bonds, potentially 
confounding the effect of bond passage.  To examine this, we generalize our dynamic RD 
specification, adding indicators for the presence of a parcel tax measure in relative year  and for 
its passage.32  Columns 8 and 9 report the measure passage coefficients for bonds and parcel 
taxes. The estimated effects of bond measures are unchanged, while parcel tax measures have 
imprecise effects that cannot be distinguished from zero or from the bond coefficients. 
C.  Willingness to Pay for School Facility Investments 
It is instructive to compare the magnitude of our spending and house price effects.  In 
close elections (those with margins of victory or defeat less than two percentage points), the 
proposed bond averages $6,309 per pupil.  The average house in these districts is worth 
                                                 
32 We constrain the vote share polynomial to be the same for the two types of measures. 
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$236,433, so our estimated 3.0% effect on house prices in the year of the election raises the value 
of the average house by $7,136, and the 6.2% effect in year 3 corresponds to $14,633.  
Converting these price changes to estimates of the willingness-to-pay for school spending 
requires assumptions about bond interest rates, consumers’ discount rates, and the speed with 
which new facilities are brought into service.  Under a range of assumptions, we obtain estimates 
of the marginal WTP for $1 per pupil in school facilities spending of approximately $1.50 for 
homeowners who moved to the district in the year following a bond passage, and around $2 for 
homeowners who moved in three to four years later.33 
Previous estimates of capitalization focus on price responses to permanent increases in 
annual spending.  Comparison of our results to these requires us to convert the one-time 
expenditures financed by bonds to an equivalent annual flow.  We calculate a range of $330 to 
$460 for this annuity, using discount rates of 5.24% and 7.33%, respectively (Barrow and Rouse, 
2004).  This implies an elasticity of prices with respect to school spending between 0.43 and 
0.61.  By comparison, Bradbury, Mayer and Case (2001) and Hilber and Mayer (2004) find an 
elasticity of 0.23 in Massachusetts, though this rises to 0.57 when they focus on districts where 
state spending caps are most binding.  As California’s spending formula is unusually restrictive, 
the latter is probably a better comparison.  Barrow and Rouse (2004) focus on the impact of state 
aid unaccompanied by tax increases.  Their main results, from a national sample, imply 
elasticities with respect to compensated spending less than one third the size of ours.  Again, 
however, their results are substantially larger when they focus on districts similar to California 
(in this case, high income and education).  Moreover, this comparison is extremely sensitive.  If 
homebuyers assume that changes in state aid formulas will be reversed after ten or twenty years, 
for example, Barrow and Rouse’s implied price response is much closer to ours. 
There are, however, important differences between our study and the earlier work.  The 
Bradbury-Mayer–Case, Hilber-Mayer, and Barrow-Rouse studies all examine unrestricted 
spending.  This should produce larger elasticities than does restricted spending.  On the other 
hand, the extremely low levels of capital investment in California may mean that the returns to 
                                                 
33 We discuss the calculation of these figures in Appendix B.  Our comparison of home price effects to the per-pupil 
school revenues is appropriate if the marginal homebuyer has 1 school-aged child.  This almost exactly matches the 
average number of children in owner-occupied California households in the 2000 census who moved in after 1990.  
The Appendix also discusses tax considerations.  Allowing for the deductibility of property taxes and mortgage 
interest from income taxes lowers the implied WTP, but this is largely offset by the higher tax price borne by recent 
movers in California.  The net effect is to reduce the WTP estimates by about 20%, leaving them still well above $1. 
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spending are considerably higher there than in other states.34  Finally, differences in estimates 
may derive in part from differences in research designs; we are the first in this literature to 
employ a regression discontinuity framework.  Overall, we interpret our capitalization estimates 
as somewhat large but well within the range of plausible effect sizes implied by earlier work.  
Since new homebuyers are willing to pay much more in house prices and property taxes 
than the total new school investments per house, why do bond referenda ever fail?  It is 
important to stress that house price effects reflect the preferences of the marginal homebuyer.  As 
discussed in Section III, many voters make their decisions on the basis of their personal 
valuations rather than the anticipated effect on home prices, and many residents may have lower 
valuations than does the marginal homebuyer.  Moreover, our estimates are local to districts 
where measures barely pass, typically with a 2/3 vote.  The returns to investment in these 
districts may be higher than those elsewhere, and in particular the many districts that have never 
considered a bond measure may have much lower returns. 
D.  Academic Achievement 
Passage of a bond measure appears to lead to large increases in a school district’s capital 
spending, no change in current spending, and substantial house price appreciation.  Taken 
together, these results reveal that improvements in school facilities yield outputs that 
homebuyers value.  These outputs may include academic achievement. 
Table 9 reports estimates of the effect of bond passage on third grade reading and math 
scores.  The effects are small and insignificant for the first several years.  This result is expected 
given the time it takes to execute capital projects; the flow of services should not begin for 
several years.  However, the point estimates are generally positive and seem to gradually trend 
upward.  This pattern becomes clear in Figure 10, which plots the point estimates and confidence 
intervals from the math score specifications.  By year six, we see large, significant effects, 
corresponding to about one sixth of a school-level standard deviation.  In terms of the more 
familiar student-level standard deviations, these correspond to effects of roughly 0.067 for 
reading and 0.077 for math.35   
                                                 
34 Another potentially important difference is the structure of bond measures.  Districts are required to announce the 
projects that will be undertaken before placing the measure on the ballot.  This may impose some accountability for 
the use of the funds, limiting managers’ ability to divert the funds toward unproductive purposes.  This would imply 
higher capitalization rates than for less-carefully-targeted funds. 
35 We use the ratio of school-level to student-level standard deviations on the 2007 California Standards Tests (CST) 
to convert school-level to student-level SDs. 
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Given the noisiness of the test score data we view these results as merely suggestive: 
beyond year six, confidence intervals become quite large and the point estimates are not 
consistently positive.36   Nevertheless, they are striking, particularly given that the spending in 
question is restricted to the capital account.  Our findings suggest that the improvements to 
existing facilities elicited by bond passage, such as repairs to broken windows or the replacement 
of portable classrooms, may raise achievement by about one third as much as a reduction in class 
sizes from 22 to 15 students (Krueger 1999, 2003).37   
Even a maximal interpretation of our test score results, however, cannot account for the 
full house price effects seen earlier.  Previous research on school quality capitalization (see 
Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007), Black (1999), and Kane, Riegg, and Staiger (2006)) has 
found that a one school-level standard deviation increase in test scores raises housing prices 
between four and six percent.  This implies that our estimated year-6 effect on test scores would 
produce a housing price increase just over one percent.38   
The majority of the estimated three to six percent effect on housing prices (Table 7) must 
be attributable to non-academic school outputs.  These may be particularly important in the case 
of school facilities improvements.  Parents may value new playgrounds or athletic facilities for 
the recreational opportunities they provide; enhanced safety from a remodeled entrance or drop-
off area; and improved child health from asbestos abatement and the replacement of drafty 
temporary classrooms, even if these do not contribute to academic achievement.  New facilities 
may also be physically appealing, perhaps enhancing the desirability of the neighborhood.  Any 
improvements in these unobservable dimensions of school output will lead to housing price 
effects that exceed those reflected in student achievement measures.  The potential relevance of 
these channels underscores the importance of using housing markets—rather than simply test 
scores gains—to value school investments. 
                                                 
36 Due to missing data, the sample size drops significantly after year 6.  Only 58% of districts remain in our sample 
seven years after a bond election. 
37 We find no evidence that bond passage affects teacher-pupil ratios, nor that the results could be attributable to the 
construction of new, smaller schools.  Results available upon request. 
38 An increase of .185 of a school-level standard deviation in test scores multiplied by an effect of 6 percentage 
points would yield a price increase of just 1.1 percentage point.  This calculation may understate the achievement 
effect somewhat, as test scores effects may continue to grow beyond the six year window in which we are able to 
reliably estimate them.  (Note that the last year of our estimates corresponds to the cohort of 3rd graders who entered 
school in the 3rd year after measure passage, before the capital projects were likely complete.) 
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F.  Household Sorting 
The recent empirical literature on the capitalization of school quality emphasizes the 
importance of social multiplier effects deriving from preferences for wealthy neighbors (see, e.g., 
Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan, 2004).  If wealthy families have higher willingness-to-pay for 
school output than do poor families, passage of a bond may lead to increases in the income of in-
migrants to the district, creating follow-on increases in the desirability of the district, in house 
prices, and in test scores. 
In Panel A of Table 10 we report dynamic RD estimates for the impact of bond approval 
on sales volumes.  Volumes would be expected to rise if passage leads to changes in the sort of 
families that prefer the school district.  The estimates show that sales volumes increase by 200-
300 units per year.  An analysis of log volumes indicates about a 3% increase in sales, though 
this is not statistically significant.39   
The remainder of Table 10 examines data on the composition of families directly.  In 
Panel B, we find no distinguishable effect on the incomes of new homebuyers or on the racial 
make-up of these new residents as measured by the share that are white and Asian.40  Panel C 
reports measures describing school district enrollment.  We present estimates for the whole 
district as well as for Kindergarteners and 1st graders; to the extent that families are unwilling to 
move once their children begin school, effects on sorting may be concentrated in early grades.  
We find no effect on total enrollment in early grades. 
We similarly find no impact on average parental education (available only for the full 
district population) or on overall racial make-up.  We do, however, find a small increase in the 
fraction of white and Asian students in Kindergarten.  Interestingly, this effect is absent (or at the 
least dramatically smaller) in first grade.41  Since bond revenue is frequently used to extend 
Kindergarten programs from half- to full-day (DiMassa 2003), one potential explanation is that 
some families switched from private Kindergartens to public schools after bond passage.  While 
                                                 
39 Sales volume could also represent an increase in the local supply of homes, but we are unable to disentangle 
supply and demand effects because yearly data on housing supply is not available.  However, we test whether bond 
passage leads to a change in the composition of houses by estimating our dynamic RD model for housing features 
such as square footage and lot size.  No composition effects are observed. 
40 One caveat is that income is self-reported, from the HMDA data.  To the extent that lower income homeowners 
tend to over report their true incomes, this would bias our estimates towards zero.  As explained in the data section, 
we are also unable to distinguish between intra- and inter-district moves. 
41 We have also estimated results for disaggregated racial groups.  Asian (and, to a much lesser extent, white) 
Kindergarten enrollment rises, while Hispanic enrollment falls. 
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there is some state-level evidence that private Kindergarten enrollment declined in the past 
decade relative to enrollment in private elementary and secondary grades, this potential reaction 
is unlikely to explain more than a very small fraction of the housing price effect.42 
Since we observe a limited set of characteristics of new movers, it could be that sorting 
effects are concentrated in other dimensions, such as parental education or the presence of 
children.  Even so, sorting is not likely to account for our full price effect.  The literature 
indicates that social multiplier effects on house prices could be as large as 75% of the direct 
effect of school quality (Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan, 2004).  This would indicate that at most 
2.5 percentage points of the estimated 6% price effect in year 3 could be due to sorting, still 
leaving a large portion that must be attributable to increased school output.   
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
In this paper we develop a “dynamic” regression discontinuity design to estimate the 
value of school facilities to parents and homeowners.  Drawing on the unique characteristics of 
California’s system of school finance, we identify the effects of capital investments on housing 
prices by comparing districts in which school bond referenda passed or failed by narrow 
margins.  Unlike districts where bond referenda garnered overwhelming voter support or 
opposition, the set of districts with close votes are likely to be similar to each other in both 
observable and unobservable characteristics.  The analysis is complicated by the tendency for 
districts in which proposed bonds are rejected to propose and pass additional measures in future 
years.  Our dynamic RD specification accounts for these feedback effects, bringing the 
identification power of a traditional RD design into a panel data context. 
We first examine the impact of passing a bond proposal on school spending.  We find 
sharp and sizable flypaper effects.  Bond approval increases capital outlays, and there is no sign 
that any funds are diverted toward current spending.  This is surprising: the inclusion of repairs 
and maintenance on the list of allowed bond-funded projects would seem to provide ample room 
for districts to divert previously unrestricted funds, but this appears not to happen.  It is possible 
                                                 
42 State level data on private school enrollment is based on Private School Affidavits summarized on the California 
Department of Education’s Ed-Data website.  The average cost of a private full-day elementary school program in 
California was roughly $3,000 in 1999 (U.S. Department of Education 2007).  
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that the requirement to announce capital projects in advance makes it difficult to divert funds 
toward non-capital uses.   
This flypaper result implies that our subsequent analyses can be interpreted as revealing 
the effects of school facilities.  We find that passing a measure causes home prices to rise by 
about six percent.  As theory predicts, most of this effect appears well in advance of the 
completion of the funded projects.  We also find some evidence of effects on student 
achievement several years after bond passage, but very little effect on the income and racial 
composition of the school district.  The home price effects presumably reflect the anticipation of 
increased school output, though it seems likely that much of the effect derives from dimensions 
of output (such as safety) that are not picked up by test scores. 
Our results provide clear evidence that the districts that we study are spending well below 
the economically efficient level.  It is worth emphasizing that our results are identified from 
districts at the margin of passing a bond.  Evidently, the referendum process erects too large a 
barrier to the issuance of bonds and prevents many worthwhile bond issues.  A loosening of 
California’s constraints on local spending would yield substantial economic benefits.  Our results 
may have similar implications for other states and localities with low levels of capital investment 
and highly centralized systems of school finance.
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Appendix A 
Resource Allocation with Restricted Funding 
Under fairly general conditions, an optimizing school district given additional restricted 
revenues will divert some of the additional revenues to other purposes, by reducing the allocation 
of unrestricted revenues to the targeted accounts.  This prediction will fail to hold only if the 
district was previously at a corner solution, allocating no revenue to the targeted accounts; in this 
case, there is no possibility of diversion. 
A school district receives funding y from federal and state transfers plus local revenues; 
we treat all as exogenous to local decisions.  The district allocates this funding across school 
facilities (k) and current inputs such as teachers and textbooks (e).  Let A measure educational 
outputs, and suppose that the educational production function is A = f(k, e).  If revenues are 
unrestricted, the district maximizes A subject to the budget constraint k+e ≤ y.  Let k(y) and e(y) 
be the optimal resource choices; these will sum to total revenues, k(y) + e(y) = y, and (assuming 
an interior solution) will equate the marginal product of each type of spending, f1(k(y), e(y)) = 
f2(k(y), e(y)). For typical production functions, both k(y) and e(y) will be increasing in y.  Thus, 
a grant of additional unrestricted revenues r will lead to increases in both capital and current 
spending, k(y+r)>k(y) and e(y+r)>e(y). 
Now suppose that the new revenues are restricted to the capital account. One might 
expect this sort of restricted grant to increase capital revenues by the full amount r, to k(y) + r. 
But this is usually not so.  The grant restrictions simply add an additional constraint, k ≥ r.  This 
can be satisfied with much smaller increases if k(y) > 0.  An optimizing district will re-allocate 
unrestricted revenues toward the current account.  That is, rather than choosing (k(y) + r, e(y)), 
the district will devote only k* < k(y) of its unrestricted revenues to the capital account, leading 
to a total capital allocation of k*+r<k(y)+r and total current spending of e* > e(y).   
The degree of diversion will depend on the extent to which the k ≥ r constraint is binding.  
In one extreme, it is not binding at all – the district would have chosen capital spending greater 
than r even without constraints (k(y+r) > r).  In this case, the restriction has no effect on the 
district’s allocation decisions.  For this sort of district, the passage of a restricted bond is 
predicted to lead to increases in both capital and current spending identical to those that would be 
seen with an unrestricted revenue grant.   
On the other extreme, a district might, if unconstrained, choose to spend nothing on 
capital (k(y+r)=0).  In this case, the restriction is extremely effective:  The district cannot devote 
a negative amount of its unrestricted budget toward the capital account.  It instead selects a 
corner solution, setting k* = 0 and e* = y.  This yields total capital spending of r and total current 
spending of y.  The additional revenues thus “stick” entirely in the capital account, with no 
spillovers to the current account. 
Of course, there are intermediate cases.  If k(y) > 0 but k(y+r) < r, a restricted grant will 
lead to more capital spending than would an unrestricted grant, but less than would occur if the 
district were unable to re-optimize upon receipt of the grant. 
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Appendix B 
Willingness-to-Pay and Elasticity Calculations 
 This appendix describes how the reduced-form effects of bond passage on house prices 
can be converted to obtain estimates of the marginal homebuyer’s willingness-to-pay for school 
spending and of the elasticity of house prices with respect to school spending. 
 We make a number of assumptions in the calculations.  We assume that the (nominal) 
interest rate on bonds is 4.6%, that a rental unit is equivalent to 0.6 owner-occupied units, and 
that the tax burden is divided evenly among all of the (owner-equivalent) housing units in the 
district.  We consider a bond issue of $6,309 per pupil, with a 30-year maturity, in a district with 
average housing price of $236,433 and 2.4 owner-equivalent units per pupil.43  We consider two 
discount rates, 7.33% and 5.24%, both taken from Barrow and Rouse (2004).   
 The simplest calculation is the willingness-to-pay for additional spending.  Under the 
assumption that marginal homebuyers have exactly one school-aged child per household, we 
assume that the price effects reflect the willingness-to-pay for a per-pupil share of the average 
bond.  The estimates in Column 4 of Table 7 indicate that bond passage raises prices by 3.02% in 
the first year, or $7,136 for the average house.  With 2.4 homes per pupil, a single home’s share 
of the average bond issue is $2,629.  This requires annual property taxes of $163, with present 
discounted value of $1,952 (1 = 7.33%) or $2,431 (2 = 5.24%).  Thus, the willingness to pay 
for $6,309 per pupil in bond funds is $7,136 + $1,952 = $9,087 (1) or $7,136 + $2,431 = $9,567 
(2), implying a willingness-to-pay for $1 per pupil in spending of 1.44 or 1.52, respectively.  
 Table 7 indicates that the price effects are larger a few years after the election than in the 
first year.  By this point, some of the taxes will already have been paid, but (assuming that 
planning and executing a construction project takes several years) none of the benefits will have 
been received.  Moreover, because the arrival of benefits is approaching, these benefits will be 
discounted to a lesser degree.  Thus, a constant willingness-to-pay would imply slowly rising 
price effects over this period, though cannot account for the steep rate of increase.  Our estimate 
of the willingness-to-pay is 1.63 in year 2, 2.12 in year 3, and 1.70 in year 4 (for 1; 2 implies 
1.76, 2.31, and 1.89, respectively).  It is not possible to extend these estimates beyond year 4, as 
the assumption that all of the benefits arrive after that date is untenable. 
 The calculations thus far omit two tax considerations.  First, because California freezes 
valuations at the original purchase price, new homebuyers pay a disproportionate share of 
property taxes.  Using Ferreira’s (2007) tabulation of effective property tax rates in California, 
we compute that property tax increment that raises $1 per house will cost a new homebuyer 
about $1.35 and a long-term resident only about $0.58.  This implies that the above calculations 
understate the tax burden borne by new buyers.  Offsetting this, however, is the income tax 
deductibility of property tax payments and mortgage interest payments.  When we incorporate 
both of these features into the calculation, our year-4 price estimates imply that marginal 
                                                 
43 The bond amount and housing price are the means among districts with measures that pass or fail by less than 2%.  
The equivalence of a rental unit with 0.6 owner-occupied units is computed by comparing the present discounted 
value of the California mean monthly rent for a renter-occupied unit in 2000 (using a 5.24% discount rate) with the 
mean value of owner occupied homes.  The count of housing units per pupil is the average in our sample; the 
average for districts with close elections is similar.  Note also that the $6,309 per pupil of the average bond is quite 
close to the present discounted value of our point estimates of the effect of bond passage on total spending in years 
1-18, $5,672 ( = 7.33%) or $6,086 ( = 5.24%). 
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homebuyers are willing to give up $1.35 (1) or $1.51 (2) worth of consumption in order to 
provide $1 per pupil to the school district’s capital budget.44 
Other studies of the home price effects of school spending do not report the implied 
willingness-to-pay for spending.  To estimate the elasticity of housing prices with respect to 
annual school spending, as reported by Bradbury, Mayer, and Case (2001) and Hilber and Mayer 
(2004), we first compute the size of the annuity that yields the same discounted value as the 
temporary spending increase made possible by the bonds.  This is $462 (1) or $330 (2).  Next, 
we divide this by annual per pupil spending (in the year of the election, averaged over all 
districts where a measure passed or failed by less than two percentage points), $6,767.  The bond 
measures therefore represent an increase in the flow of spending of 6.8% (1) or 4.9% (2).  
Comparing these to the housing price effects from Table 7, Column 4, we obtain elasticities of 
year-0 prices with respect to spending of 0.44 or 0.61, respectively.  Elasticities of year-4 prices 
are 0.68 and 1.03, again depending on the discount rate. 
 Barrow and Rouse (2004) estimate the effect of state aid—which they interpret as free 
transfers—on aggregate home prices, both measured in per pupil terms.  To adapt our results to a 
similar metric, we first convert our effects on house prices to effects on property values per 
pupil.  The estimates from Table 7, Column 4 indicate price effects of $7,136 in year 0 and 
$12,348 in year 4.  Multiplying this by 2.4 housing units per pupil, we find effects of $17,126 in 
year 0 and $29,635 in year 4.  Comparing these to the average bond value, $6,309, we estimate 
that school spending with present discounted value of $1 per pupil raises aggregate property 
values by $2.71 in year 0 and $4.70 in year 4. 
Barrow and Rouse’s (2004) estimates represent the effect of free transfers, while the bond 
spending studied here must be paid for by increased property taxes.  To compute the effect of 
tax-financed spending implied by Barrow and Rouse’s estimates, we first note that they compare 
their results to the null hypothesis that prices rise by $1 per dollar of present discounted value of 
future state aid.  The ratio of their estimates to the null, less one, can therefore be interpreted as 
the effect of $1 of state aid to be paid for with $1 in taxes (both in present value).  Their main 
specification yields an estimated coefficient of 30.285; this corresponds to a housing price effect 
per dollar of bonds of 0.16 (with a discount rate of 5.24%) to 0.63 (with a discount rate of 7.3%). 
While these estimates are lower than our findings, several further considerations help 
reconcile these results.  First, Barrow and Rouse find much greater capitalization in better-
educated and higher-income districts.  To the extent that California’s education and income 
levels are higher than the national average, we would expect Barrow and Rouse’s estimate for all 
districts to underestimate the housing price effect for the state.  Barrow and Rouse’s estimates for 
the top 80% of districts by education (as measured by the share of the population without a high 
school diploma) yield a range of 0.42 – 0.99, while their estimates for the top quintile of districts 
by average household income yield 2.52-3.93.  Further, the interpretation of their results is quite 
sensitive to the discount rate: using a 10% discount rate, their estimates of the effect on property 
values range from 1.1 for all districts to 5.7 for the top quintile.  Finally, Barrow and Rouse’s 
estimates reflect the value of a permanent increase in state aid, while homebuyers might be 
uncertain about the permanency of the policy changes they examine.  If the stream of state aid is 
expected to persist for only 20 years, the implied effect on property values per dollar of future 
spending is much larger.  Thus, our estimates are not out of line with theirs. 
                                                 
44 We assume that the owners of the transacted homes will average 130% of the per-house tax burden, that the new 
buyers finance 80% of the increment to home prices associated with a bond using a 30-year mortgage with a fixed 
8% interest rate, and that they face a marginal income tax rate of 32%. 
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Table 1. School bond measure summary statistics 
 
Mean SD
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1987 29 3,134 0 0.52 64.61 11.96
1988 33 5,081 0 0.61 67.84 8.21
1989 28 3,103 0 0.50 66.39 9.67
1990 31 7,096 0 0.42 61.35 15.17
1991 55 7,612 0 0.40 64.04 10.32
1992 57 7,467 0 0.40 62.16 10.79
1993 45 7,305 0 0.47 62.07 11.68
1994 50 7,365 0 0.42 65.11 9.62
1995 84 6,266 0 0.48 65.03 10.94
1996 50 5,780 0 0.70 70.26 7.94
1997 110 7,244 0 0.64 68.86 8.68
1998 116 6,762 0 0.60 68.74 9.30
1999 82 9,425 0 0.62 69.59 9.73
2000 86 6,307 0 0.65 69.44 8.72
2001 50 8,338 0.48 0.84 68.65 9.24
2002 146 6,004 0.89 0.79 63.44 8.50
2003 18 6,542 0.50 0.56 61.58 9.59
2004 106 8,130 0.93 0.82 65.15 8.62
2005 35 10,157 0.74 0.86 64.70 6.53
2006 109 9,748 0.96 0.72 60.97 7.88
Fraction 
approved
Avg $ PP 
year-2000 $
Vote share in favorNumber of 
measures
Fraction 
55% req.
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Table 2. School district descriptive statistics for fiscal, housing markets and academic variables 
All school Diff (4)-(5)
disricts (t stat)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of districts 948 319 629
A. Fiscal variables
Number of observations 10197 3306 6891 626 218
Log enrollment 7.43 6.18 8.03 8.34 8.09 0.25
[1.69] [1.43] [1.47] [1.48] [1.48] (2.13)
Long-term debt PP $1,984 479 2,706 1,736 1,247 489
[3,286] [1,793] [3,581] [3,072] [2,388] (2.41)
Total expenditures PP $7,466 7,410 7,493 7,290 6,941 349
[2,177] [2,293] [2,119] [1,898] [1,921] (2.32)
Total capital outlays PP $922 679 1,038 882 935 -53
[1,100] [905] [1,164] [1,005] [1,112] (0.62)
Total current instr. exp. PP $3,905 4,034 3,844 3,824 3,618 206
[808] [941] [728] [703] [677] (3.82)
Total current non-instr. $2,439 2,555 2,383 2,412 2,269 143
exp. PP [789] [964] [683] [661] [608] (2.92)
B. Housing market variables
Number of observations 15151 4578 10573 731 382
House prices 241537 190337 263706 285857 210499 75,358
[198,618] [149,691] [212,612] [240,439] [178,766] (5.91)
Log house prices 12.16 11.95 12.26 12.33 12.08 0.25
[0.65] [0.62] [0.65] [0.66] [0.55] (6.71)
Square footage 1603 1572 1615 1625 1637 -11
[407] [456] [386] [401] [363] (0.47)
Lot size 56772 97604 39797 32342 49388 -17,047
[81,652] [111,614] [57,266] [48,933] [60,891] (4.73)
Sales volume 881 316 1126 1519 1134 385
[1,966] [951] [2,225] [3,568] [1,445] (2.54)
Income of homebuyers 96482 84753 101674 107689 90339 17,350
[59,094] [45,204] [63,606] [70,382] [58,903] (4.36)
Log income of homebuyers 11.36 11.25 11.40 11.45 11.31 0.14
[0.46] [0.43] [0.47] [0.49] [0.41] (5.13)
C. Achievement variables
Number of observations 9748 3240 6508 460 170
Reading, grade 3 0.172 0.103 0.206 0.159 0.187 -0.028
[0.91] [0.96] [0.88] [0.93] [0.81] (0.37)
Math, grade 3 0.067 -0.058 0.129 0.115 0.095 0.020
[0.90] [0.99] [0.85] [0.88] [0.82] (0.27)
Never 
proposed a 
measure
Proposed at 
least one 
measure
Passed a 
measure 
(time t-1)
Failed a 
measure 
(time t-1)
 
Notes: Samples in columns 1, 2 and 3 include all available observations in all years. Columns 4 and 5 include only 
observations for the year prior to a bond measure.  Fiscal variables are available for years 1995-2005, housing 
market variables for 1988 to 2005 (with the exception of income and log income that span the years 1992-2006), and 
test scores for 1992-1993 and 1997-2006. 
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Table 3. Pre-bond measure balance of treatment and control groups 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Fiscal Outcomes
Long term debt PP 167 -608 -411 79 24 61 86
(192) (344) (312) (165) (61) (90) (86)
Capital outlays PP -185 -230 -163 -44 -4 46 88
(89) (139) (129) (148) (89) (124) (127)
Current instructional exp. PP 91 -23 -12 35 -7 -5 -1
(45) (69) (62) (36) (19) (29) (31)
B. Housing market outcomes
House prices 53011 -2243 643 3743 5580 4631 4657
(9113) (13713) (13393) (4447) (2260) (4592) (4255)
Log house prices 0.184 0.043 0.040 0.013 0.015 0.020 0.017
(0.029) (0.044) (0.043) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
C. Achievement outcomes
Reading, grade 3 -0.040 0.147 0.185 -0.010 -0.022 -0.032 -0.022
(0.084) (0.127) (0.117) (0.054) (0.033) (0.055) (0.057)
Math, grade 3 0.042 0.180 0.214 0.054 -0.054 -0.002 0.004
(0.083) (0.119) (0.109) (0.062) (0.037) (0.055) (0.056)
Year effects & threshold control Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cubic vote share N Y Y Y N Y Y
Sample pools relative years [-2, 6] N N Y Y N N Y
Bond measure fixed effects N N N Y N N N
Year before election (t-1) Change, t-2 to t-1
 
Note:  Estimates in columns 1-2 and 5-6 are estimated from cross-sectional data with observations for the year 
before a measure.  Columns 3, 4, and 7 are taken from the static RD model (equation (7)), with only the effect of 
passage in the year before the election reported.  In column 4, the effect two years before the election is constrained 
to zero.  Models for house prices include controls for square footage, lot size and sales volume.  Standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and, in columns 3, 4, and 7, clustered at the school district level. See text for additional 
description of samples. 
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Table 4. Static RD estimates of effect of bond passage on fiscal variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Effect of measure passage 1 year later 1932 332 256 35 94
(360) (178) (152) (39) (127)
Effect of measure passage 2 years later 2290 939 801 9 61
(439) (218) (194) (43) (148)
Effect of measure passage 3 years later 2210 1274 1144 3 -63
(473) (277) (250) (45) (174)
Effect of measure passage 4 years later 1607 973 872 -25 94
(574) (310) (284) (55) (171)
Effect of measure passage 5 years later 908 210 238 -19 166
(613) (320) (281) (71) (167)
Effect of measure passage 6 years later 367 -326 -351 -19 21
(660) (338) (284) (74) (184)
R2 0.77 0.73 0.47 0.90 0.77
State aid 
PP
LT debt PP
Total 
expend. PP
Capital 
outlays PP
Curr. Instr. 
expend. PP
 
Notes:  "Static" specification is used, following equation (7) in the text.  The  sample includes relative years [-2, +6] 
and N=6,970. Coefficients shown are the interaction between relative year indicators and an indicator for bond 
passage.  All specifications include measure fixed effects; a full set of absolute and relative year indicators; and 
interactions between relative year indicators 1 through 6 (0, -1, and -2 are excluded) and the passage indicator, a 
cubic in the measure vote share, and a linear measure of the required vote share.  Standard errors are clustered on the 
school district.  Dependent variables are measured in constant year-2000 dollars per pupil. 
 
 
Table 5. Dynamic RD estimates of effect of bond passage on fiscal variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Effect of measure passage 1 year later 1944 198 220 22 46
(442) (188) (157) (46) (130)
Effect of measure passage 2 years later 2586 853 792 -28 -6
(563) (235) (228) (52) (185)
Effect of measure passage 3 years later 3408 1688 1549 -33 257
(563) (337) (299) (49) (308)
Effect of measure passage 4 years later 3371 1841 1660 -64 169
(619) (417) (308) (64) (211)
Effect of measure passage 5 years later 3425 1169 1091 -80 149
(691) (374) (268) (77) (192)
Effect of measure passage 6 years later 3139 701 554 -82 87
(689) (389) (267) (80) (215)
R2 0.72 0.61 0.32 0.83 0.59
State aid 
PP
LT debt PP
Total 
expend. PP
Capital 
outlays PP
Curr. Instr. 
expend. PP
 
Notes:  "Dynamic" specification is used following equation (8) in the text. The sample includes all available years of 
data and N=7,038.  All specifications include district fixed effects; a full set of absolute year indicators; indicators 
for the presence of a measure on the ballot in each relative year from 1 to +18 ; and interactions between the relative 
year indicators and an indicator for passage of the bond considered in that relative year, the required vote share, and 
a cubic polynomial in the actual vote share.  Only the bond passage interactions for [+1, +6] (i.e. for the six years 
prior to the year in which the outcome is measured) are shown.  Standard errors are clustered on the school district.  
Dependent variables are measured in constant year-2000 dollars per pupil.   
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Table 6. Dynamic RD alternative specifications for fiscal outcomes in 4th year after election 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LT debt PP 3371 3733 3689 3534 -190 -542 1777 1711 2826
(619) (596) (583) (873) (382) (816) (984) (813) (621)
Total expenditures PP 1841 1848 1796 1808 -100 167 891 1436 1273
(417) (361) (385) (452) (219) (386) (488) (502) (404)
Capital outlays PP 1660 1664 1586 1527 -234 82 544 1300 1233
(308) (268) (270) (421) (170) (307) (387) (471) (336)
Curr. instr. expend. PP -64 -80 -65 21 75 110 55 34 -67
(64) (58) (58) (86) (55) (93) (76) (73) (63)
State aid PP 169 277 190 393 -121 0 615 -91 -120
(211) (192) (199) (230) (136) (249) (211) (309) (259)
3-part 
linear
Linear
3-part 
cubic
Switch 
55% & 
67%
High capital 
spending 
districts
Low capital 
spending 
districts
Actual 
minus 10
Actual 
plus 10
Placebo thresholds
Base 
(cubic)
 
Notes:  Each cell represents a separate regression.  Specification in column 1 is that used in Table 5; only the 
coefficient for measure passage four years prior is shown.  Column 2 replaces the cubic vote share control 
(interacted with relative year indicators) with a linear vote share control; column 3 uses separate linear segments in 
the [0, 55], [55, 66.7], and [66.7, 100] ranges; and column 4 uses separate cubic segments in each range.  Columns 
5-7 include the actual measure passage indicator as well as counterfactual indicators that reflect vote shares in 
excess of alternative thresholds.  Columns 8 and 9 use the "static" specification from Table 4, restricting the sample 
to measures where capital spending in the year before the election was above (col. 8) or below (col. 9) $562 per 
pupil, the median across all measures.  Standard errors are clustered on the school district.   
 
 
Table 7. Static and Dynamic RD estimates of effect of bond passage on housing prices 
Prices Log prices Prices Log prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect of measure passage in year of election 12232 0.021 10907 0.030
(5107) (0.015) (6922) (0.017)
Effect of measure passage 1 year later 13691 0.027 13891 0.036
(6247) (0.017) (8046) (0.018)
Effect of measure passage 2 years later 13900 0.036 11758 0.042
(7872) (0.020) (9354) (0.020)
Effect of measure passage 3 years later 19251 0.058 14898 0.062
(9371) (0.022) (11290) (0.021)
Effect of measure passage 4 years later 18466 0.038 21667 0.052
(10473) (0.024) (11540) (0.022)
Effect of measure passage 5 years later 23188 0.038 28167 0.054
(11621) (0.027) (11829) (0.026)
Effect of measure passage 6 years later 13945 0.047 21139 0.067
(14485) (0.035) (14286) (0.034)
R2 0.958 0.977 0.916 0.962
Static Dynamic
 
Notes: Static and dynamic specifications are similar to those in Tables 4 and 5, respectively - see notes to those 
tables for details. Dynamic specifications include indicators for the presence of a measure on the ballot in each 
relative year from 0 to +19. All housing price estimates also include controls for square footage, lot size and sales 
volume. Number of observations is 8,016 (cols. 1-2) and 10,313 (cols. 3-4). 
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Table 8. Dynamic RD alternative specifications for housing prices in 5th year after election 
Switch 
55% & 
67%
Actual 
minus 10
Actual 
plus 10
Bond 
effect
Parcel tax 
effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Prices 28167 34434 27258 36455 -51409 -2974 34787 33807 -3862
(11829) (11130) (13027) (20306) (20917) (17543) (24784) (10504) (27035)
Log prices 0.054 0.064 0.042 0.130 -0.048 0.054 -0.032 0.068 0.023
(0.026) (0.024) (0.030) (0.056) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.023) (0.038)
Other elect ions
Base 
(cubic)
3-part 
cubic
Linear
Placebo thresholds
3-part 
linear
 
Notes:  Each cell represents a separate regression.  Specification in column 1 is that used in Table 7, Columns 3-4; 
only the coefficients for measure passage five years prior are shown.  Column 2 replaces the cubic vote share control 
(interacted with relative year indicators) with a linear vote share control; column 3 uses separate linear segments in 
the [0, 55], [55, 66.7], and [66.7, 100] ranges; and column 4 uses separate cubic segments in each range.  Columns 
5-7 include the actual measure passage indicator as well as counterfactual indicators that reflect vote shares in 
excess of alternative thresholds. Columns 8 and 9 come from the same specifications, with all of the controls from 
column 1 plus controls and all interactions for parcel tax measures.  The "win" coefficients for bond measures are in 
column 8, and those for parcel tax measures are in column 9.  Standard errors are clustered on the school district. 
 
 
Table 9. Static and Dynamic RD estimates of effect of bond passage on third grade test scores 
Reading Math Reading Math
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect of measure passage 1 year later 0.027 0.038 -0.010 -0.012
(0.045) (0.056) (0.054) (0.057)
Effect of measure passage 2 years later 0.008 -0.006 -0.023 -0.034
(0.048) (0.058) (0.051) (0.054)
Effect of measure passage 3 years later 0.061 0.043 0.058 0.030
(0.053) (0.069) (0.053) (0.062)
Effect of measure passage 4 years later 0.013 0.039 -0.026 0.026
(0.061) (0.072) (0.058) (0.062)
Effect of measure passage 5 years later 0.076 0.086 0.039 0.058
(0.061) (0.077) (0.061) (0.069)
Effect of measure passage 6 years later 0.151 0.185 0.103 0.160
(0.065) (0.080) (0.064) (0.075)
R2 0.933 0.902 0.880 0.842
Static Dynamic
 
Notes: Static and dynamic specifications are similar to those in Tables 4 and 5, respectively - see the notes to those 
tables for details. Dynamic specifications include indicators for the presence of a measure on the ballot in each 
relative year from -14 to +19. Number of observations is 6,084 (cols 1-2) and 6,660 (cols. 3-4). 
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Table 10. Dynamic RD estimates of effect of bond passage on house sales and homebuyer and 
student characteristics 
1 yr later 2 yrs later 3 yrs later 4 yrs later 5 yrs later 6 yrs later N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Housing market transactions
Sales volume 93 207 282 213 241 325 10857
(78) (89) (93) (98) (116) (115)
Log sales volume -0.001 0.041 0.031 -0.005 0.032 0.039 10857
(0.056) (0.062) (0.066) (0.068) (0.070) (0.073)
B. Homebuyer characteristics
Income 3245 1042 -2384 4212 1486 450 9921
(2624) (2645) (3113) (3435) (3218) (3391)
Log income 0.027 0.017 -0.005 0.035 -0.008 0.004 9921
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Fr. white & Asian 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.008 9921
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
C. School district characteristics
Log enrollment, all grades -0.012 -0.011 0.010 0.001 0.001 -0.007 7,038
(0.017) (0.020) (0.025) (0.039) (0.035) (0.042)
Log enrollment, Kindergarten 0.018 -0.001 0.009 0.000 -0.030 -0.004 5,899
(0.022) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.034)
Log enrollment, 1st grade -0.006 0.003 0.005 0.017 -0.018 -0.017 5,877
(0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.034)
Fr. white & Asian, all grades -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.004 7,035
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Fr. white & Asian, Kindergarten 0.016 0.026 0.038 0.042 0.056 0.050 4,279
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
Fr. white & Asian, 1st grade -0.004 0.008 0.011 0.025 0.027 0.006 4,263
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
Avg. parental education, all grades -0.060 -0.218 -0.018 -0.169 -0.163 0.005 6978
(0.096) (0.170) (0.156) (0.218) (0.161) (0.149)  
Notes: All regressions use the dynamic specification - see notes to Table 5 for details. Kindergarten and 1st grade 
enrollments and racial shares exclude districts with grade-level enrollment below 50. 
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Figure 1. Density of bond measures by vote share 
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Notes:  Vote shares are censored at 40 and 85. 
 
Figure 2. Number of additional measures considered and passed within four years following 
bond measure election, by margin of victory/defeat 
0
.5
1
A
vg
. #
 o
f m
ea
su
re
s
-10 -5 0 5 10
Vote share relative to threshold (2 pp bins)
Considered
0
.5
1
A
vg
. #
 o
f m
ea
su
re
s
-10 -5 0 5 10
Vote share relative to threshold (2 pp bins)
Passed
 
Notes:  Graphs show average number of measures considered or passed in years 1, 2, 3, and 4 after the focal 
election, by the vote share in that focal election.  Bins are two percentage points wide:  Measures that passed by 
between 0.001% and 2% are assigned to the 1 bin; those that failed by similar margins are assigned to the -1 bin. 
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Figure 3. Static RD estimates of the effect of bond passage on the number of measures passed 
since the year of the focal election 
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Notes:  Graph shows coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from RD regressions of the cumulative number of 
measures approved since the year before the election on an indicator for measure passage, controlling for a cubic in 
the vote share and an indicator for a 55% requirement.  Regressions are estimated separately for each relative year. 
 
Figure 4. Long term debt per pupil, by vote share, one year before and three years after election 
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Notes:  Graph shows average long term debt per pupil in each bin in the listed year relative to the election.  
Averages are conditional on year fixed effects, and the -1 bin is normalized to zero.  Measures that passed by 
between 0.001% and 2% are assigned to the 1 bin; those that failed by similar margins are assigned to the -1 bin.   
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Figure 5. Capital outlays per pupil, by vote share, one year before and three years after election 
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Notes:  Graph shows average capital outlays per pupil in each bin in the listed year relative to the election.  
Averages are conditional on year fixed effects, and the -1 bin is normalized to zero.  Measures that passed by 
between 0.001% and 2% are assigned to the 1 bin; those that failed by similar margins  are assigned to the -1 bin.   
 
Figure 6. Current instructional expenditures per pupil, by vote share, one year before and three 
years after election 
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Notes:  Graph shows average current instructional expenditures per pupil in each bin in the listed year relative to the 
election.  Averages are conditional on year fixed effects, and the -1 bin is normalized to zero.  Measures that passed 
by between 0.001% and 2% are assigned to the 1 bin; those that failed by similar margins  are assigned to the -1 bin. 
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Figure 7. Static and dynamic RD estimates of effect of bond passage on capital outlays per pupil 
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Notes:  Graph shows coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimates of the “static” and “dynamic” RD 
specifications reported in Column 3 of Tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
 
Figure 8. Log housing prices by vote share, one year before and three years after election 
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Notes:  Graph shows average log housing prices in each bin in the listed year relative to the election.  Averages are 
conditional on year fixed effects and the -1 bin was normalized to zero.  Measures that passed by between 0.001% 
and 2% are assigned to the 1 bin; those that failed by similar margins are assigned to the -1 bin. 
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Figure 9. Static and dynamic RD estimates of effect of bond passage on log housing prices 
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Notes:  Graph shows coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimates of the “static” and “dynamic” RD 
specifications reported in Columns 2 and 4, respectively, of Table 7.  To preserve a readable scale, tears 16-18 are 
not shown. 
 
Figure 10. Static and dynamic RD estimates of effect of bond passage on test scores 
-.
2
0
.2
.4
M
ea
n 
m
at
h 
sc
or
e 
(i
n 
sc
ho
ol
-l
ev
el
 s
td
. d
ev
ia
ti
on
s)
0 2 4 6
Year (relative to election)
Static Estimate Dynamic Estimate
Static 95% CI Dynamic 95% CI
 
Notes:  Graph shows coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimates of the “static” and “dynamic” RD 
specifications, reported in Columns 2 and 4, respectively, of Table 9.   Only years 1-6 are shown.
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Appendix Table 1. Dynamic RD estimates of effect of bond passage on district balance sheet 
1 yr later 2 yrs later 3 yrs later 4 yrs later 5 yrs later 6 yrs later
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total revenues 288 458 899 741 657 667
(201) (271) (479) (436) (450) (497)
Federal revenuse -5 -44 -73 -65 -58 -93
(21) (26) (34) (32) (41) (46)
State revenues 46 -6 257 169 149 87
(130) (185) (308) (211) (192) (215)
Local revenues 248 508 715 637 566 673
(156) (220) (265) (356) (400) (427)
Loc. rev. - property tax collections 112 253 372 387 422 410
(78) (159) (162) (313) (300) (321)
Loc. rev. - interest earned 44 127 123 110 74 84
(23) (21) (35) (61) (61) (63)
Loc. rev. - all other 91 129 221 140 70 178
(140) (129) (165) (108) (108) (139)
Total expenditures 198 853 1,688 1,841 1,169 701
(188) (235) (337) (417) (374) (389)
Current elementary/secondary 3 -13 -6 12 -61 -49
(68) (96) (105) (170) (168) (184)
Instructional 22 -28 -33 -64 -80 -82
(46) (52) (49) (64) (77) (80)
Operation and maintenance of plant -25 -81 -84 -83 4 -13
(35) (48) (54) (57) (53) (67)
Other 6 96 111 160 16 47
(44) (59) (74) (130) (128) (137)
Non-elementary/secondary -42 -9 -22 0 16 17
(24) (16) (18) (22) (26) (28)
Capital outlays 220 792 1,549 1,660 1,091 554
(157) (228) (299) (308) (268) (267)
Intergovernmental payments 8 19 34 44 14 67
(15) (35) (37) (58) (77) (83)
Interest on debt 9 65 132 125 108 112
(13) (23) (27) (30) (33) (31)
Revenues minus expenditures 90 -395 -789 -1,100 -512 -35
(185) (286) (324) (257) (282) (290)
Assets 1,852 2,455 2,601 2,088 1,671 1,376
(549) (711) (612) (1,173) (1,110) (1,160)
Debt 1,941 2,572 3,420 3,369 3,442 3,159
(442) (574) (565) (623) (695) (693)
Long term 1,944 2,586 3,408 3,371 3,425 3,139
(442) (563) (563) (619) (691) (689)
Short term -3 -14 12 -2 17 20
(10) (22) (8) (12) (11) (11)
Assets minus debt -89 -117 -819 -1,281 -1,771 -1,783
(487) (527) (623) (1,189) (1,165) (1,251)  
Notes: All regressions use the dynamic specification - see notes to Table 5 for details.  All variables are measured in 
constant year-2000 dollars per pupil. 
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Appendix Figure 1. Dynamic RD estimates of effect of bond passage on capital outlays per 
pupil, excluding district fixed effects, by years before or after election 
-2
00
0
-1
00
0
0
1
00
0
2
00
0
M
e
an
 c
a
pi
ta
l o
u
tla
ys
 P
P
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Year (relative to election)
Estimate 95% CI
 
Notes:  Specification is identical to that used in Table 5, Column 3, except that district fixed effects are excluded and 
all measure indicators, vote share polynomials, and passage indicators are interacted with a full set of indicators for 
years -11 through +18.  The specification in Table 5 included district effects and constrained all pre-election 
coefficients (i.e. all years -11 through 0) to zero. 
 
 
